How Secret is the Service?: Exploring the Validity and Legality of a Secret Service Testimonial Privilege by Prouty, Julie
Volume 104 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 104, 
1999-2000 
10-1-1999 
How Secret is the Service?: Exploring the Validity and Legality of a 
Secret Service Testimonial Privilege 
Julie Prouty 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Julie Prouty, How Secret is the Service?: Exploring the Validity and Legality of a Secret Service Testimonial 
Privilege, 104 DICK. L. REV. 227 (1999). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol104/iss1/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
How Secret is the Service?: Exploring
the Validity and Legality of a Secret
Service Testimonial Privilege
I. Introduction
President William Jefferson Clinton has had a tumultuous term
of office. Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation of
Mr. Clinton's alleged wrongdoing raised several unprecedented
matters of Constitutional dimension.' One of the most controver-
sial of these issues was Mr. Starr's subpoena of several members of
the United States Secret Service to the grand jury investigation of
the President.2 In total, thirty-three Secret Service officers of
varying ranks were called upon to testify as to matters and acts of
which they individually saw or overheard the President participate
in with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky.' The
members of the Secret Service, through the Secretary of the
Treasury,4 unsuccessfully asserted a "protective function" privilege
keeping them from testifying against the President.5 Thus, the
question arises as to whether the Secret Service and hence the
President should enjoy such a protective function privilege.
1. As a result of Mr. Starr's investigation and report, President Clinton was impeached
by the House of Representatives for "high crimes and misdemeanors" pursuant to Article
II, Section 4 of the United States Constitution. See 144 CONG. REC. H11968-03 (daily ed.
Dec. 19, 1998). The House of Representatives has the sole constitutional authority to
impeach a president. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
2. The subpoenas were met with resistance from the United States Secret Service, and
they asserted a previously unheard-of protective function privilege in the federal courts. See
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp.2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998).
3. See THE STARR REPORT: THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL'S COMPLETE REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE INVESTIGATION OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 16-18 (Pocket Books 1998).
4. The Secret Service is a division of the Treasury Department. See 3 U.S.C. § 202
(1994). Thus, the Secretary of the Treasury is the cabinet member responsible for raising
such issues.
5. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No 98-148, 199 WL 272884, at *1 (D.D.C. May
22, 1998). The Secret Service argued for the court to recognize an absolute protective
function as a basis for withholding testimony from the federal grand jury proceedings
regarding the President. See id.
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The issue is a matter of first impression decided by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals. 6  The United States Supreme Court
denied the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General's
petition for certiorari.7 Although the Supreme Court decided not
to hear the case, the issues are significant and timely in that they
may come before the United States Congress for consideration.8
Further, the validity and legality of a Secret Service protective
function privilege reaches well beyond the controversy surrounding
President Bill Clinton. Any decision as to the creation of such a
privilege will obviously affect the relationship between the Secret
Service agents and all Presidents to come.
The arguments are simplistic and come down to two juxtapos-
ing theories. The first is that the continued absolute protection of
the President of the United States depends on his faith and trust in
the Secret Service members who constantly surround him.9 It has
been argued that United States security is actually at risk if the
Secret Service members are not granted this privilege, because
without it, the President will risk safety to keep private matters
away from the earshot or vision of the officers.1"
On the other side of this extremely controversial issue is the
common premise that ours is a government of laws, not of men."
The people control the government, which belongs to them, not
any one official, including the President. 2 We often, if not
always, hold our President to a higher standard than we do
ourselves. 3 He is the representative of all of America, the only
6. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cit. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. Jul. 16, 1998) (No. 98-93), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
7. See Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 462 (1998) (Breyer, J. and Ginsburg, J.
dissenting).
8. See 144 CONG. REC. E1182-05 (daily ed. June 19, 1998) (statement of Rep. Delay
(asserting that the issue of a protective function privilege should be before Congress, not the
federal judiciary); see also Hearing on the Dept. of Justice Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
105th Cong. 49-53 (1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
9. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *4. The Secret Service claims
that, without the protective function privilege, "current and future Presidents would inevita-
bly distance themselves from Secret Service personnel, thereby endangering the life of the
Chief Executive." Id.
10. See id.
11. See Donald C. Smaltz, Is the Independent Counsel Too Independent?, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 5, 1998, at A31 (asserting that the government "belongs to the people, not to the
officials who temporarily hold office with our consent").
12. See id.
13. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. The "take-care" clause of the United States
Constitution implies that the President be of strong moral and legal character; otherwise, it
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elected official with a national constituency. Excepting matters of
national security, there are very few if any actions of the President
to which the Secret Service should not be able to testify. 4 The
President is to be of the highest moral and legal character. 5 The
President should not be able to assume that any possible illegal
activity will not be reported.
Other equally important issues spur from the major arguments
in favor of and in opposition to a protective function privilege for
the United States Secret Service (hereinafter "Secret Service").
Does the President of the United States have an expectation of
privacy? Both the President and the Vice-President are required
to accept Secret Service protection. 6 Those proposing a protec-
tive function privilege for the Secret Service argue that, due to this
mandatory protection, the President should expect that his
conversations and actions would be kept in confidence. 7 Alterna-
tively, however, the Secret Service agents are law enforcement
officials who have a duty to report all evidence of crime." Those
propounding this argument state that an exception to the duty to
disclose evidence of criminal conduct for the President of the
United States is not warranted, for the President should not feel
licensed to commit any criminal wrongdoing of any kind. 9
Whether or not Secret Service agents are present is irrelevant.E°
would be functionally impossible for him to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
14. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *4. The court found that
people acting within the law would not push away those trusted and relied upon for fear that
the information disclosed would be reported to a federal grand jury. See id.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1994 & Supp. 1996). The statute states that all others except
those listed in § 3056(a) (the President, Vice-President, President-Elect, and Vice-President-
Elect) may waive Secret Service protection; it is, therefore, mandated for the President. See
id.
17. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
461 (1998). "The Secret Service has a tradition and culture of maintaining the confidences
of its protectees." Id. The Secret Service urges that the privilege is necessary to carry out
its mandatory protective function for the President due to the necessity of close physical
proximity to the protectee for the protection to maintain its effectiveness. See id. If the
President shies away from protection due to lack of confidence, it is argued, the protective
function becomes ineffective. See id.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
19. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *4. "When people act within
the law, they do not ordinarily push away those they trust or rely upon for fear that their




Should there be such a privilege, are there any limitations?
The Secretary of the Treasury argued that there should be an
absolute protective function privilege.21  Yet, such a broad
privilege could prove unwieldy, and in many instances, contrary to
justice. Limitations, however, are difficult to articulate and flesh
out, especially for a judicial body.
The final issue, then, is whether this is a matter for the federal
courts to contemplate at all. Congress created the mandatory
Secret Service protection of the President.22 It is Congress's
prerogative to articulate a protective function privilege for these
officers.23 The creation of the privilege may best be left to the
legislative process for determining whether the American people
are even willing to accept and embrace such a privilege, and if so,
what the parameters of the privilege should be.
This Comment suggests that, if there is to be a Secret Service
protective function testimonial privilege, it should be one articulat-
ed by the United States Congress. This conclusion is in accordance
with the opinions of both the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit as well as the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.24 The asserted privilege does not meet the
United States Supreme Court standard for judicial creation of a
testimonial privilege.25 Further, the rationale for a protective
function privilege rests entirely on public policy considerations.26
There exist many views on the validity and legality of the proposed
privilege and its limitations. Therefore, the legislative branch, as
the body of government most representative of the people and
whose purpose it is to decide matters of public policy, is the one
most suited for debating and developing this issue.
21. See id. at *1. However, exceptions were carved out in the proposed privilege:
officers not on duty could report, and officers who overheard statements or witnessed
actions, that at the time of the observation, were sufficient to provide reasonable grounds
that a felony had been, was being, or will be committed may be compelled to testify. See id.
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
23. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *2.
24. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461
(1998); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884.
25. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1996) (providing a three-part test for
determining judicially-created privileges).
26. See id. There is virtually no federal or state history for a protective function
privilege, so the only determinative criterion is the existence of relevant public policy
concerns. See infra Section IIA & B.
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Part II of this Comment explores the legislative history as well
as the limited federal common law history of this proposed
privilege. Part III then analyzes the asserted privilege within the
Supreme Court's criteria for judicially created privileges. Several
public policy issues are explored and debated. Finally, Part IV
concludes that as legally valid as a protective function privilege may
be, the United States Congress is the proper branch of government
to decide both its necessity and its parameters.
II. Background
The existence and validity of a Secret Service testimonial
privilege is a novel issue with very limited, if any, history.
However, there are many relevant background issues essential to
the complete understanding of the nature of this controversy.
A. The Investigation of President William Jefferson Clinton
In the spring of 1992, during the presidential campaign, an
article appeared in the New York Times alleging that presidential
candidate William Jefferson Clinton had been involved in a land-
use scandal while serving as governor of Arkansas. 27 This scandal
later became commonly known as simply "Whitewater," named
appropriately after the land in question. 8  The scandal settled
temporarily, and Clinton was elected President of the United States
in November 1992.29
In July of 1993, however, White House lawyer Vince Foster,
who was in charge of the Whitewater matter, committed suicide.3 °
At the same time, it was becoming obvious that there were indeed
criminal acts involved in the Whitewater matter, and these acts may
have benefitted the President and the First Lady.31 In early 1994,
President Clinton was forced to inquire of Attorney General Janet
Reno whether she would appoint Independent Counsel to look into
the matter.32 The Attorney General appointed Kenneth Starr.33
27. See Phil Kuntz, Preface to THE STARR REPORT: THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL'S
COMPLETE REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE INVESTIGATION OF PRESIDENT CLINTON xii
(Pocket Books 1998).
28. See id. at xi-xii.
29. See id. at xii.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Kuntz, supra note 27, at xii.
33. See id. at xiii.
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Mr. Starr discovered that a key player in the Whitewater matter,
Arkansas lawyer Webster Hubbell, was receiving large sums of
money for consulting fees (allegedly to remain silent to the matter
rather than cooperate with the investigation in exchange for a
lenient sentence) from people including Washington, D.C. lawyer
and close friend to the President, Vernon Jordan. 4
President Clinton's scandals were not limited to Whitewater,
however.35 Contemporaneous with the impending Whitewater
investigation, Paula Jones filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against
the President for acts allegedly committed during his tenure as
governor of Arkansas. 6 As the Jones case unfolded, a former
White House aide, Linda Tripp, leaked statements related to sexual
indiscretions the President may have been involved in with another
aide, Kathleen Willey. 7 Ms. Tripp was transferred to the Penta-
gon where she met former White House intern, Monica Lewin-
sky." Lewinsky confided in Tripp and disclosed to her an affair
Lewinsky was involved in with President Clinton. 9 Tripp taped
telephone conversations that disclosed that Vernon Jordan
arranged for Lewinsky to get a job in New York City when it
became apparent that Lewinsky would be forced to become a part
of the Jones matter.' Tripp took this information to Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr, and the connection to Jordan provided the
ammunition Starr needed to have Attorney General Reno expand
the scope of his jurisdiction to include the investigation of alleged
obstruction of justice on the President's part in the Jones case.41
With this expanded investigatory power bestowed upon the Office
of the Independent Counsel, Starr sought by subpoena the grand
jury testimony of several Secret Service agents who allegedly had
knowledge of President Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky.42
The White House launched a litigious attack, claiming a protective
function privilege for these agents.43 The proposed privilege was
not accepted, and more than thirty Secret Service agents were
34. See id. at xiii.
35. See id. at xii.
36. See id.
37. See Kuntz, supra note 27, at xii.
38. See id.
39. See id. at xiv.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Kuntz, supra note 27, at xiv.
43. See id.
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compelled to testify in the grand jury proceedings which would
eventually lead to the impeachment of the President of the United
States for only the second time in this country's history.'
B. Privileges-Federal Rule of Evidence 501
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 allows federal courts to
recognize privileges.45 The Supreme Court, however, has ruled
that, when contemplating a new privilege, the courts must consider:
1) whether the asserted privilege is historically rooted in federal
law; 2) whether states recognize the privilege or its state-applied
derivative; and 3) whether it involves significant issues of public
policy.' Further, the Supreme Court has held that privileges "are
not lightly created nor expansively construed."47 It is, therefore,
a daunting task to have the judiciary create a privilege of any kind,
let alone one that has never been asserted or exercised in prac-
tice.'
C. Applicable Statutes to the Controversy
The applicable statutes cause a potential conflict between
mandatory protection and a duty to report criminal activity. The
Secret Service must protect the President and Vice-President of the
United States; neither official has a choice in accepting the physical
protection.49 In addition, all executive personnel have a duty to
report any criminal activity committed or potentially committed by
executive branch officers and by employees of the Attorney
General.5" Hence, the President has no choice but to have
constant physical protection, yet the officers themselves have a
statutory duty to report any criminal conduct. A proposed
44. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461
(1998); see also 144 CONG. REC. Hl1968, H12039-40 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998) (impeaching
President Clinton).
45. FED. R. EVID. 501.
46. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1996) (holding that there is a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege based upon the application of these three criteria).
47. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
48. The Secret Service has never claimed such a privilege before the Clinton-Lewinsky
matter, and members of the Secret Service have been willing to testify in the past. See In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *3 (D.D.C. May 22, 1998)
(stating that Secret Service agents have testified in matters relating to former President
Nixon's tapes and to John Hinckley's assassination attempt on former President Reagan).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
1999]
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protective function privilege is arguably inconsistent with the joint
effect of the two relevant statutes.
D. Congressional Debates
There were many heated debates in both the United States
Senate and the House of Representatives about the possibility of
the Secret Service protective function privilege.5 Most debates
took place in the respective judiciary committees.52 In fact,
Congressman Thomas Delay of Texas called for the President to
submit to the United States Congress proposed legislation pertain-
ing to such a privilege.53 Furthermore, Senator Leahy has an-
nounced plans to introduce a bill calling for a Secret Service
protective function privilege.54
E. In re Grand Jury Proceedings and In re Sealed Case
In May 1998, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia heard the Office of Independent Counsel's (hereinaf-
ter "OIC") motion to compel the testimony of certain Secret
Service officers in the federal grand jury investigation of the
President. The District Court granted the motion.56 Shortly
thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the lower court's decision.57 The Attorney
General and Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, representing
the Secret Service agents, filed a petition for certiorari.58
The issue that came before the federal courts is complicated
and one of first impression. Although Secret Service agents have
repeatedly testified in numerous matters,59 no Secret Service
51. See generally 144 CONG. REC. E1182-05 (daily ed. June 19, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Delay) (asserting that the issue of a protective function privilege should be before Congress,
not the federal judiciary).
52. See id. at E1183.
53. See id. at E1182, E1183 (daily ed. June 19, 1998) (statement of Rep. Delay).
54. See Hearing on the Dept. of Justice Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong.
49-53 (1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
55. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884 (D.D.C. May 22,
1998).
56. See id. at *6.
57. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461
(1998).
58. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. Jul. 16, 1998) (No. 98-93).
59. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *3 (in reference to Secret
Service agent testimony in the Nixon tapes case and in the attempted assassination of
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officer has ever been compelled to testify to matters dealing
exclusively with his observations of the Chief Executive while
performing his traditional protective function. 6°  The Secret
Service, through the Secretary of the Treasury and the United
States Attorney General, proposed the following privilege:
[T]he protective function privilege absolutely protects "informa-
tion obtained by Secret Service personnel while performing
their protective function in physical proximity to the President,"
except that the privilege "does not apply, in the context of a
federal investigation or prosecution, to bar testimony by an
officer or agent concerning observations or statements that, at
the time they were made, were sufficient to provide reasonable
grounds for believing that a felony has been, is being, or will be
committed.61
This privilege has been rejected both at the District Court and
United States Court of Appeals levels.62 Over the dissent of both




The Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General
sought relief from the wrong branch of government in arguing their
assertion of a protective function privilege for the United States
Secret Service. Although they sought immediate relief that,
logically, can be granted only by the courts (the courts have the
ability to articulate a privilege pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 501), the proper forum for the creation of such a privilege
is the legislative branch. The Supreme Court has held that the
judicial formation of any privilege, notwithstanding such a novel
issue as a Secret Service protective function privilege, carries with
it a significant burden for the proposed privilege's advocate.'
The advocates of the asserted protective function privilege have not
President Reagan case, the court stated, "the fact remains that Secret Service agents have
been willing to testify in the past and have never before felt the need to assert a privilege.").
60. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076.
61. See id. at 1075.
62. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *6; see also In re Sealed Case,
148 F.3d at 1079.
63. See Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).




met this burden, and hence such a privilege should be the product
of the legislative process, not judicial activism.
A. Historical Precedent in Federal Law
In Jaffee v. Redmond,6" the Supreme Court held that, in order
for the federal courts to accept or create a privilege, three
conditions must be considered, at least one of which must be met
in order to create or recognize a privilege.66 The first of these is
whether the privilege has any historical precedent in federal law.67
No such historical precedent exists for a Secret Service protective
function privilege.' Arguably, it is unreasonable to expect that
there would be federal history for such a privilege when no
member of the Secret Service has ever asserted one or been
compelled by the Independent Counsel to testify before a federal
grand jury.69 Secret Service officers have, however, divulged the
knowledge they accumulated while performing their protective
function. °
Further, there is significant evidence that Congress never
anticipated such a privilege.71 Congress left no choice for the
President and Vice-President in accepting the physical protection
of the United States Secret Service.72 When the legislators
mandated that the Chief Executive would have constant Secret
Service protection, Congress contemplated these agents to be
located in the immediate physical proximity of the President.73 As
such, the legislators must have realized these agents would be privy
65. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
66. See id. at 8-15.
67. See id. at 13-15.
68. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *2 (D.D.C. May
22, 1998).
69. See id. at *3 (noting that this action marked the first time the Secret Service ever
asserted a protective function privilege as well as the first time Secret Service agents have
ever been compelled to testify).
70. See id. at *3 (noting that Secret Service agents have testified both at judicial and
non-judicial proceedings about President Nixon's taping system and the attempted assassina-
tion of President Reagan).
71. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (stating that the President has
no choice but to accept Secret Service protection); see also 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (West 1994
& Supp. 1996) (requiring that any information of criminal activity in the department of the
executive branch must be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General).
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a).
73. See generally id (using term "protection" throughout the statute and historical note,
implying physical protection).
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to all details relevant to the Presidency and much of the President's
personal life.
Although there is no relevant legislative history rejecting a
protective function privilege, the very nature of the mandated
protection of the President coupled with the lack of any statutory
testimonial privilege arguably implies that Congress did not intend
such a privilege. Further, Congress enacted a separate statute that
requires all executive branch employees to report any criminal
activity committed by any government official.74 This legislation
provides further evidence that the members of the United States
Secret Service assigned to the protection of the President are
afforded no special privilege to refrain from testifying in a grand
jury investigation of the Chief Executive. The President is not
excepted from the government officers and employees to whom the
statute is aimed,75 and therefore, should not enjoy a protective
function privilege for his Secret Service agents unless one is newly
created by the branch of government that created these applicable
statutes, the United States Congress.
B. Applicable State Precedent
The second element that the Supreme Court considers when
contemplating a new privilege is whether the laws of the states
embrace such a privilege.76 No state currently recognizes a
protective function privilege.77 However, it is unrealistic to expect
that state law would provide any basis for a Secret Service
protective function privilege. It is arguably unfair to even consider
this criterion in light of this uniquely federal issue. The criterion
was certainly applicable in a situation such as that presented in
Jaffee v. Redmond, where a majority of states had already recog-
nized the psychotherapist-patient privilege being asserted.7" In the
present controversy, however, the argument that no privilege
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b). Information, allegations, or complaints of crimes involving
government officers and employees is to be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General
by the head of the department or agency of the executive branch receiving such complaint,
allegation, or information. See id.
75. See generally id. (including no provisions excluding any executive official, including
the President, from the application of the Act).
76. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1996).
77. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *3 (D.D.C. May
22, 1998).




should be found because there is no similar state privilege is
tenuous at best.79 It is interesting to note, however, that there is
no similar privilege for the protectors of governors or other high-
ranking state officials.8"
C. Public Policy Issues
The Supreme Court's final factor for consideration of the
creation of a new privilege in federal law is whether it involves
significant issues of public policy.8" One of the major arguments
in favor of a protective function privilege is that if the President
fears Secret Service officers could testify against him, he might
adhere to the protection less, thereby endangering his life and the
well-being of the American people.82 The D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals noted, however, that while this is a serious issue of public
policy, the Secret Service did not meet the burden required by
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 of showing "with compelling clarity"
that a failure to recognize the privilege will jeopardize the agents'
ability to carry out their protective function privilege of the
President.83 The court went on to state that although the nation
and the court share a profound interest in the safety of the
President, the fears of the Secret Service are based largely on
speculation.' The President takes an oath to faithfully execute
the office of the Executive and has a duty to faithfully execute the
laws of the United States.8 5 As was observed by the D.C. District
Court, when people are law-abiding, there is little to no incentive
to push away those who protect them due to the fear of later
damaging testimony in a judicial setting.86 Thus, the privilege in
79. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
80. See id.
81. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
82. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075.
83. See id. (stating that "[wihile courts must listen with the utmost respect to the
conclusions of those entrusted with responsibility for safeguarding the President, we must
also assure ourselves that those conclusions rest upon solid facts and a realistic appraisal of
the danger rather than vague fears extrapolated beyond any foreseeable threat"); see also
FED. R. EvID. 501.
84. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
524 U.S. 399 (1998)).
85. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; see also id., § 3, cl. 4.
86. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148 WL 272884, at *4 (D.D.C. May 22,
1998).
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its proposed form 7 provides no more of an incentive for the Presi-
dent to avoid the physical proximity of the Secret Service than does
the status quo. If the President's conversations and actions stay
within the letter of the law, he has no reason to fear.88 Further,
if the President commits acts that he has a reason to believe the
agents will find felonious or evidence of a past or future felony, the
privilege will still not protect him.89
It could be argued that if the proposed privilege were to have
little if any effect upon the actions of the President and his Secret
Service agents then there would be no reason not to allow it. This
theory, like the one asserted by the Secret Service in the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,9" is entirely specula-
tive. Even if this scenario were to be true, the viability of a
judicially created protective function privilege is still questionable.
It is well established that privileges are not lightly construed. 91 A
questionable issue of public policy should not be enough for the
courts to articulate a previously unheard-of privilege. Congress is
the body of the federal government responsible for handling issues
of public policy; legislation is the product of public policy de-
bates.92 Therefore, Congress is the proper branch of government
to handle such an issue of public policy.
The public policy debate, however, is not limited to whether
the proposed privilege will provide an incentive for the Chief
Executive to avoid Secret Service protection. The fact that the
President has a duty to faithfully uphold and execute the laws of
87. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The proposed privilege
provides an absolute protection of information obtained by Secret Service agents while
performing their protective function, yet this asserted privilege delineates some exceptions.
See id. The privilege would not apply to information obtained by Secret Service agents off-
duty from their protective function. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at
*1. Moreover, the privilege would not be applicable to overheard information or witnesses
actions which, at the time they were committed, were sufficient to provide a reasonable
suspicion that a felony has been, was being, or will be committed. See In re Sealed Case, 148
F.3d at 1075.
88. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at 4.
89. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1077 (stating that the purpose of the privilege to
enhance presidential protection is further weakened by the very form of the proposed
privilege).
90. See id. at 1076 (quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998)).
91. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
92. See D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., ET. AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, BRIEF
EDITION 231 (Harper Collins College Publishers 1994) (stating that much of what Congress
does is not specified in the Constitution, but is "largely a product of the values and interests
of the 535 members...").
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the United States93 is itself an issue of public policy that clashes
with the validity and necessity of the proposed protective function
privilege.94 Although some view the physical protection of the
President to be paramount to all other considerations,9" it is
significant that we expect our Chief Executive to be law-abiding
and of a high moral character.96 To allow a protective function
privilege for Secret Service agents, some might argue, would be to
concede that the President is in many instances above the law.'
Such a privilege might even be seen to give the President license to
commit various indiscretions.
Finally, another public policy concern is that Secret Service
agents are law enforcement officers who have a duty to report
criminal activity.98 The fact that Congress articulated such a duty
in statutory form provides significant evidence that a protective
function privilege is unwarranted." The President is a govern-
mental official and, hence, is one of the targets of the statute
requiring disclosure of criminal activity."°  Because Americans
arguably hold the President to a higher moral and legal stan-
dard,' it is logical to assume that no special exception would be
93. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
94. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *4 (D.D.C. May
22, 1998). ("It is not at all clear that a President would push Secret Service protection away
if he were acting legally or even if he were engaged in personally embarrassing acts. Such
actions are extremely unlikely to become the subject of a grand jury investigation.").
95. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076 (recognizing that the Secret Service claims
that protecting the physical safety of the President is the transcendent public good that
justifies the privilege).
96. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
97. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *4. The Court places
emphasis on the theory that a law-abiding person would have no need for a protective
function privilege. See id.
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994). With limited exception, "[a]ny information,
allegation, or complaint received in a department or agency of the executive branch of the
Government relating to violations of Title 18 involving Government officers and employees
shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General by the head of the department or
agency." Id. Because the Secret Service is a department or agency of the executive branch,
see 3 U.S.C. § 202 (1994), Secret Service agents clearly fall within the purview of the above
statute, and therefore, have a duty to disclose evidence of criminal activity committed by
government officials.
99. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *5 (finding that a protective
function privilege would contradict the goal of 28 U.S.C. § 535(b), which is to ensure that
executive branch employees report evidence of criminal activity by government officials).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b).
101. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3, cl. 4; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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made for his actions, and therefore, the privilege becomes unneces-
sary.
D. Creation of a Testimonial Privilege Through Judicial Activism
There are numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has
rejected privileges such as an editorial process privilege for the
press, a state legislator privilege, an accountant-client relationship
privilege, and others."t2 Further, in the landmark United States v.
Nixon case, the Supreme Court asserted that privileges must be
narrowly construed." 3 Although the above mentioned rejected
privileges (with the exception of Nixon) seem to carry with them
less controversy and consequences, similar principles can be applied
to the present issue. An in-depth analysis of the need and efficacy
of a Secret Service protective function privilege shows that it is for
all intents and purposes unnecessary, at least in the immediate
context, which would require judicial intervention rather than
legislative action.
One could expect that anyone engaged in wrongdoing,
including the President of the United States, would logically
distance himself from anyone with a duty to report criminal or
questionable activity. Although the President has no choice but to
be protected by the Secret Service,"° the protection is most
warranted when the President is outside the confines of the White
House.0" At least in the current controversy, the questionable
102. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979) (rejecting an editorial process
privilege); see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 806 (1984) (rejecting
an accountant work product privilege); cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36
(1973) (rejecting an accountant-client privilege).
103. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974) (holding that privileges are "not
lightly created nor expansively construed"). United States v. Nixon represents the infamous
"Nixon tapes" case, what some consider the last major presidential scandal before the
Clinton-Lewinsky matter. Then President Nixon was implicated in the burglary of
Democratic Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in Washington, D.C. See id. at 687.
Alleged incriminating evidence was recorded on tapes of conversations between President
Nixon and various advisors in the Oval Office of the White House. See id. at 688. The case
arose out of President Nixon's unwillingness to relinquish the tapes, claiming an absolute
executive privilege. See id. The Court, however, was unwilling to articulate a privilege and
ordered the release of the tapes. See id. at 684. Shortly thereafter, President Nixon followed
the order and resigned his position as President.
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
105. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting the dichotomy
in the presumption that the President is in greatest need of protection when in public, yet




conduct that the officers were subpoenaed to testify about took
place in the White House.1"6 Arguably, the President would have
more of a chance to avoid direct contact with the officers and
exercise more personal discretion within the White House, making
a protective function privilege unnecessary.
E. Protective Function Privilege as Advancing the Public Good
In United States v. Gillock, °7 the Supreme Court held that
for a privilege to be created, it must advance a public good."0 8
The United States Secret Service claims that the proposed
testimonial privilege does advance the public good for national
security is better perfected by the unconditional protection of the
Chief Executive." 9 If the President cannot be assured that his
conversations and actions witnessed by Secret Service officers are
kept confidential in the face of judicial proceedings, it is argued, he
will risk his safety by avoiding protection. Although the President
may try to avoid his duty to accept protection, he is nonetheless
statutorily required to accept such protection. a0 Further, trust
and faith in the office of the Executive advance the public
good."' A privilege should not be created so that, should the
President commit indiscretions,"2 they will be silenced by a
protective function privilege. When one runs for President, he
makes a conscious decision to dedicate himself for at least four
106. See generally THE STARR REPORT, supra note 3 (wherein the testimony of more
than thirty Secret Service agents focused generally on the relationship between President
Clinton and former White House intern Monica Lewinsky, most, if not all, of which was
evidenced in the White House).
107. 445 U.S. 360 (1980) (holding that there is no state legislator privilege).
108. See id. at 375.
109. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148 WL 272884, at *4 (D.D.C. May 22,
1998).
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
111. See, e.g., SYDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1993 349 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1994) (Although
unsuccessful in his purpose, President Ford granted former President Nixon a "full, free and
absolute pardon" for his involvement in the Watergate crisis in order to restore faith and
move the nation beyond the aftermath of the scandal).
112. The privilege, as written, would ensure that more than mere indiscretions could not
be divulged in testimony. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *1
(characterizing the nature of the asserted privilege). Yet the public focus on this proposed
privilege seems to be centered on its questionable acts committed by the President or others
protected by Secret Service agents. See generally In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1077 (focus-
ing on the relevance and efficacy of such a privilege for inappropriate acts of the President).
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years to the American public.'13 He knows, entering office, that
his privacy is not that of an average citizen. No judicially created
privilege should give license to the President to be anything less
than the public professional the American people put in office.
Such a privilege, if it is to exist at all, should be granted by the
people, through their legislative representatives, who place
Presidents in office.
F Privilege as Created by Congress
The validity of a protective function privilege goes far beyond
the current controversy surrounding President Clinton. Such a
privilege or the lack thereof will have a significant impact on the
manner in which this and future Chief Executives operate.
Congress has the ability to debate the extent of any exceptions to
the possible protective function privilege. The issue surrounding
the existence of such a privilege has very divided support."1 The
ramifications of either outcome significantly impact the American
people and their faith in the Executive branch of the federal
government. If there is to be a privilege, its existence should be
backed by the strength of the democratic process.
Additionally, Congress articulated both the statute requiring
the President to accept Secret Service protection"5 and the
statute commanding agents of the executive branch to report
criminal activity by government officials." 6  Nevertheless, no
protective function privilege was ever articulated. Although there
may be a possibility that Congress did not contemplate the need for
such a privilege, the fact remains that the two statutes tend to show
that the proposed privilege goes against the intent of the legisla-
tors.117 Regardless of whether it was an oversight or whether the
privilege was never intended, in light of the relevant statutory law,
it is appropriate that the body that created the law also be the one
to modify it. Laws are created when a need arises and when the
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
114. See generally 144 CONG. REC. E1182-05 (daily ed. June 19, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Delay) (claiming Congress, not the courts, should decide the issue of a Secret Service
protective function privilege); see generally In re Grand Jury, 5 F. Supp.2d 21 (laying out the
opposing arguments of both the Secret Service through the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Attorney General and the Office of the Independent Counsel).
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
117. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *2.
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American populace demands a change." 8  A Secret Service
protective function privilege represents an issue evolving from
current events, and as in the past," 9 Congress now has the ability
to acknowledge the issue and act upon it if the proper demand
exists.
Finally, judicial creation of a protective function privilege is
moot to the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. 2° More than thirty Secret
Service officers already provided testimony for the federal grand
jury in the investigation for President Clinton."' Any reversal of
the lower courts that the Supreme Court may have articulated
would have been useless to the controversy.'22 The Secret
Service agents' observations were submitted to the Congress in The
Starr Report."2 Further, there are efforts to introduce legislation
calling for a Secret Service testimonial privilege in a future
congressional session." With such efforts already in place, it is
best to leave the creation of a Secret Service protective function
privilege to the legislative forum where details and limitations can
be fully debated.
The formation of a Secret Service testimonial privilege will
necessarily create many tangential issues requiring specific
parameters that cannot sufficiently be articulated in a judicial
forum. Specific implementation methods will need to be consid-
ered. Additionally, the nature of the context in which a protective
function privilege will be invoked is such that state secrets and
national security may come into play."2 It is easy to contemplate
118. See, e.g., CHARLES L. COCHRAN & ELOISE F. MALONE, PUBLIC POLICY: PERSPEC-
TIVES & CHOICES 88-124 (McGraw-Hill 1995) (asserting that many changes in policy result
from periods of change and need such as the Civil War Era, the Great Depression, and the
New Deal).
119. See id.
120. The issue is not only moot, but impossible to litigate any further as the United States
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the matter. See Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct.
461 (1998).
121. See generally THE STARR REPORT, supra note 27, at xv (relying throughout on the
grand jury testimony of Secret Service agents).
122. The Starr Report, with Secret Service agents' testimony, had already been submitted
to Congress and made public. See Kuntz, supra note 27, at xv.
123. See generally THE STARR REPORT, supra note 3 (relying in part on the testimony
of more than thirty Secret Service agents to assert allegations that President Clinton had
committed perjury and obstruction of justice).
124. See Hearing on the Dept. of Justice Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong,
49-53 (1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
125. Issues involving state secrets and national security, however, are properly covered
by the executive privilege, so would not necessarily have to be covered by a protective
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many scenarios in which Secret Service agents, due to their close
proximity to the President, are privy to information that cannot
become public no matter what the circumstances as a protection of
this or other nations' security.126 Beyond the obvious national
security issues, there might also be concerns about definitions of
what constitutes evidence of past or future crimes. Must a Secret
Service agent personally evaluate the observed conduct and
statements or should their be basic guidelines as to what falls
within and outside of the privilege? How and when must an agent
disregard the privilege and report what he or she has seen or
heard? These and more questions must be contemplated and
decided for a protective function privilege to have validity and
efficacy. Congress, not the courts, has the means of conducting
debates and hearings, of creating a workable legislative history that
will serve as a necessary guide to possible implementation. There
are simply too many issues and not enough precedent for a
protective function privilege to be created by any branch other than
the one most representative of the American people, the United
States Congress.
V. Conclusion
The issue of the creation of a broad Secret Service testimonial
privilege is one of first impression and one that brings incredible
controversy to all branches of the federal government as well as the
American people as a whole. There is no valid precedent for the
courts to create a protective function privilege for the Secret
Service members who were compelled to testify before the
Independent Counsel's federal grand jury. Although Federal Rule
of Evidence 501 allows the courts to recognize privileges, the
asserted privilege did not met the standard set forth by the
function privilege. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting)
(holding that the executive privilege, permissible only for the Government, is not lightly
invoked, and in order to be successful, must contain: (1) a formal claim of privilege (2)
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter (3) after actual
personal consideration by that officer).
126. For example, the likely illegal activity that took place in the Iran-Contra scandal
(secret arms sales by the United States to Iran in order to fund Nicaraguan contras) was such
that, if it had come before a federal grand jury, agents may not have been able to testify to
certain matters due to their negative implication on American, as well as Iranian and Nicara-
guan, national security. See JOHN SPANIER & STEVEN W. HOOK, AMERICAN FOREIGN




Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond.27 Further, in this most
recent presidential scandal, the privilege was unnecessary and did
not outweigh the need for probative evidence.
If such a privilege is to be created, it should be by the
legislature where all aspects and exceptions can be debated in the
public forum. Public policy issues are best handled by Congress.
Whether to extend a testimonial privilege to those Secret Service
agents who protect the President is a highly controversial policy
issue. As such, it is best left to the Congressmen elected by the
people to make these types of public policy decisions. The
American people, through their federal representatives, may indeed
find a Secret Service protective function privilege meritorious and
warranted. The issue does not end there, however. This type of
privilege would require parameters that must be carefully articulat-
ed. The legislature is best suited to debate and determine. those
parameters.
The validity and legality of a Secret Service protective function
privilege is largely undecided. Certainly there are supporters of a
vast number of meritorious positions on the issue. When an issue
like this sparks such a heated policy debate, its resolution is best
placed with the legislative branch where our representative
democracy is most evident and effective.
Julie Prouty
127. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1996).
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